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individual attributes such as gender, experience in the firm and age clearly influenced 
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1. Introduction 
Who trades in the stock market? Why? What is the relative importance of investor types 
and what is the nature of their relationship with volatility? The most recent academic 
research in finance and behavioural economics considers these questions to be of core 
importance, yet they are still far from being fully answered. In this article, we explore the 
idea that, in a saving-for-retirement setting, certain retail investors behave as noise traders 
and gamble in what is, for them at least, a casino-like environment. Of the issues unresolved 
in the literature on noise trading, two stand out as particularly relevant – the 
characterization and relative importance of gamblers compared with other similarly-placed 
individuals, and the extent to which they ‘feed’ and ‘feed-off’ market volatility to satisfy 
their need for risk-based excitement (Shleifer and Summers 1990). 
Several articles highlight the importance of behavioural and psychological drivers in 
pension decision-making. For instance, Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) deal with the effect of 
financial literacy on retirement planning, and some very recent research supported by 
improved techniques of neuroimaging, such as that of Alemanni and Lucarelli (2017), look at 
the role that psychophysiology plays in the demand for voluntary integrative pension 
schemes. Nonetheless, very little research addresses the role of gambling attitudes in the 
context of saving for retirement. In an ageing society, when most welfare systems are 
shifting from ‘defined benefit’ to ‘defined contribution’ plans, we cannot neglect 
overtrading and its effect on the volatility of stock market returns. Given the relative and 
absolute importance of the trading activity that comes from this sector of the financial 
industry, overtrading can pose a threat to both the pension-plan participants1 who, though 
ill-equipped (de Dreu and Bikker 2012), are supposed to make financial decisions in their 
best interest, and the economic system as a whole. 
The contribution of this article to the literature on investor behaviour and market 
volatility contains several novel elements. For a start, we utilize an innovative way of 
defining gamblers and non-gamblers based on realized market behaviour rather than on an 
‘a priori’ classification. Here, we go beyond the analogy and seek to employ certain markers 
of behaviour that are consistent with being a compulsive gambler to identify trading as 
gambling. As such, we match findings from cognitive psychology on compulsive behaviour 
with observed patterns of investment behaviour in a DC pension plan environment. Our 
approach resonates with that of Barberis et al. (1998) and others who suggest that 
psychological predisposition could be a crucial factor in understanding the persistence of 
distinct types of traders in financial markets. We can reproduce the standard results on the 
role of personal characteristics in driving a gambling attitude, but, unlike the other such 
studies, which rely on university students as test subjects, we are also able to address the 
importance of new subjects, such as the senior members of staff occupying permanent 
positions in financial firms.  
Moreover, we test for gambling attitudes in a saving-for-retirement framework in which 
the long-term horizon for investments, along with a natural tendency towards inertia and 
procrastination (Clark et al. 2014), is supposed to reduce the probability of such behaviour. 
Our results show that pension-plan participants can be noise traders who sometimes show 
gambling-like behaviour. We quantify the overall incidence of this behavioural pattern and 
provide empirical evidence to show that gamblers, among others, lead the action in the 
market. We then proceed to provide evidence of the dynamics of volatility feedback: in 
other words, traders produce volatility, but increased volatility draws in a non-negligible 
share of them. Finally, focusing on the behavioural drivers of the investors, we confirm the 
importance of gender and age, and address the new effects associated with increased 
technical skill (linked to the period of permanence in the scheme) and seniority in the firm. 
We have organized the remainder of the article into the following sections: in the 
literature review (section 2) we look at the behavioural literature on investment decision-
making; we set out our research hypotheses (section 3); then (in section 4) describe our 
data, methods and models; depict the results of the analysis (section 5); and finally (in 
section 6) set out our conclusions and frame the implications of our findings for the financial 
industry and for policy makers. As complementary material, there are two on-line 
appendices:  Appendix A contains a complete set of the tables and figures derived from the 
results of our empirical analysis, including those that we present in this article, whereas 
Appendix B provides a deeper insight into the type of trades and market trends. 
2. Literature review 
There are two established results acknowledged in the standard literature of finance: (1) 
that a relationship exists between retail trading and volatility, and (2) that gambling 
attitudes affect investment decision-making (Blau et al. 2016; Foucault et al. 2011; and 
Kumar 2009). However, the inverse relationship is less clear cut. In other words, we know 
very little about how volatility affects investors, particularly those who exhibit gambling-like 
behaviour and especially in the context of retirement planning. 
As De Long et al. (1989) and others have intimated, a class of individual investors may 
well be inveterate gamblers: they are drawn to financial markets by the opportunity to take 
risks, go through phases of euphoria and pessimism, and are less concerned about 
fundamental value than they are about beating the market. These people may or may not 
have domain-specific experience and skills – such attributes are less likely deployed for 
effect than they are used to justify or legitimate risk taking for its own sake – and they are 
also less likely than other similarly-skilled individuals or firms to self-regulate their 
behaviour. Consequently, there could be three kinds of traders – noise traders who are out 
of their depth; savvy investors who trade on fundamentals but whom the actions of others 
can draw into episodes of ‘over-trading’; and gamblers who are in the market for the ‘thrill 
of it’ rather than for a desired result. The issue, however, is who are these gamblers? How 
important are they in relation to other kinds of market players? And what drives their 
expectations? 
Scholars have come up with various explanations for differences in investor sentiments. 
Some believe that rational traders are likely to be well-informed and sophisticated, but 
noise traders poorly informed and prone to behavioural biases and anomalies, which makes 
market sentiment a product of investor focus (for example market prices), information and 
the consistency of investment decision-making (Mendel and Shleifer 2012). 
Not every investor is, however, a noise trader – many do not trade at all; some are quite 
sophisticated (Clark et al. 2012); and others are gamblers who, not content with the status 
quo, trade, trade again, and trade yet again well beyond the frequency of the average 
player. We assume that many people are predisposed to gamble, that is they take a chance 
when the probability of gain is small and the likelihood of loss is large (Kumar 2009).  
Cognitive predisposition is, then, another reason for heterogeneity in the market 
participants’ behaviour. There is evidence to suggest that flashes of overconfidence and 
moments of pessimism can make some people prone to errors of judgement. Scheinkman 
(2014), for example, postulates that the cognitive predispositions of two types of traders – 
optimists and pessimists – can explain the existence of ‘heterogeneous beliefs’. In this 
respect, some people might always be either optimists or pessimists. Alternatively, others 
might oscillate between the two states, thus reinforcing expectations of success without 
reference to the evidence in a rising market and expectations of poor performance despite 
the evidence in a declining market. This type of behaviour is consistent with herding and 
market following based on expectation formation over time, which in effect is recognizing 
that framing, myopia and status quo bias render many people prone to errors of judgement 
(Baron 2012). 
Apart from errors of judgement and/or a cognitive predisposition, behavioural 
psychologists suggest that experience and skill can affect the decision-making performances 
of individuals. Insofar as experience translates into learning-by-doing, so prompting the 
recalibration of expectations, some people seem able to transcend the errors due to myopia 
and status quo bias by employing Bayesian analysis rather than following market sentiment 
– these are the people whom Mendel and Shleifer (2012: 303) call ‘insiders’. Skill can also 
make a difference, especially if it is domain specific. Indeed, with the appropriate skills, 
individuals can use experience in ways that reinforce their advantages over noise traders 
and ‘outsiders’. Tests of decision-making competence, comparing undergraduates with 
investment professionals in terms of their abilities to solve problems akin to those the 
participants in financial markets face, suggests that skill and experience are important 
distinguishing attributes of individual performance (Clark et al. 2006). 
In this article, we are concerned with the determinants of compulsive behaviour in a UK 
DC pension plan and, as such, consider the frequency and timing of investment behaviour. 
The premise underpinning our research is that compulsive behaviour is indicative of a 
predisposition to gamble and not just to respond to market sentiment. In this section, we 
aim to reach a twofold goal. First, relying on recent research in cognitive science, we want 
to point out the difference between taking a risk and gambling. Second, given the 
importance of considering variations in the behaviours of diverse types of market players, 
we explain why we might expect age, gender and income to make a difference. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many people associate taking a risk with gambling, a 
link that most recent academic literature confirms. Doran et al. (2012), for example, show 
how the gambling preferences of investors affect the prices and returns of the specific 
assets that have lottery features. Consistent with prospect theory, the main findings of 
Kirchler et al. (2005) indicate a strong framing effect in decision-making involving risk taking. 
Weber et al. (2013), on the other hand, show how subjective judgements and emotional 
factors rather than quantitative estimates are key drivers of changes in risk taking; Cain and 
Peel (2004), on their part, provide an insight into the utility of gambling and analytically 
justify the phenomenon of the favourite-longshot bias. 
Three implications arise: first, there are situations in which taking a risk is the same as 
gambling. Second, if the action entails skill and experience and carries a reward, then taking 
a risk is not the same as gambling. Third, people with knowledge and understanding of the 
circumstances may be in a better position to take a risk than their less privileged 
counterparts. For them, the game may be more about risk assessment than gambling, 
whereas for others it may be more about gambling than risk taking. By this logic, we can 
define risk taking as an activity in which the player considers the existing information and 
understands the situation, including the possible payoffs associated with the various 
available strategies. To gamble is, conversely, on the roll-of-a-dice to bet in circumstances in 
which skill and experience are irrelevant to the outcome and in which all parties have an 
equal chance of success.2 
By this account, gambling would appear to be a cognitive rather than a socio-
demographic problem. However, there is evidence that men rather than women tend to 
gamble, and that men feel more confident making decisions in situations that involve 
chance. Bolla et al. (2004) showed that men process risk taking in diverse ways and are 
more adept at playing games of chance. Knowing that they are good at games of chance 
may tempt them to play them, whereas women may seek to avoid such situations. There is 
also evidence that children tend to perform worse than adults in the Iowa gambling task 
(IGT),3 and that older adults tend to outperform younger ones, perhaps because they are 
better at taking advantage of experience (Carvalho et al. 2012). Kumar’s (2009) study of 
stock-market gambling began with state lotteries, for which there is no reward for having 
any knowledge or understanding of how to play the game. Observing that those who play 
lotteries tend to be poor, young, poorly-educated single men who live in urban areas and 
belong to minority groups, he found that these same characteristics were associated with 
‘greater investments in lottery-type stocks’ (Kumar 2009: 1891). Another approach to the 
issue is through cognitive science and the psychology of decision-making under conditions 
of risk and uncertainty.  
In the IGT, gambling involves playing the game for its own sake rather than governing 
one’s behaviour in relation to the underlying structure of rewards and losses. In this respect, 
to gamble is to deny the benefits of experiential learning. The issue is self-control, namely 
whether one can balance the excitement that comes with gambling against the 
consequences of taking large and small bets.  
One characteristic of compulsive gamblers is the frequency of their betting behaviour, 
but the evidence about whether a positive or negative result affects the frequency is mixed. 
Linnet et al. (2010) suggest that loss-chasing is an indicator of compulsive behaviour in that 
those involved play the game for the excitement rather than the reward. According to Yu 
and Zhou (2006), however, some people make riskier choices following an unexpected win; 
in other words, their behaviour is not really about winning but about risk taking when, in a 
psychological sense, a win justifies placing a larger bet. Furthermore, it appears that 
gamblers gamble for longer whatever the risk and reward payoff matrix, perhaps because of 
impaired dopamine, which dampens the psychic effect of any single action (Riba et al. 
2008). Finally, in common with other forms of self-abuse such as alcohol and drug 
consumption, there is evidence that gambling is compulsive and addictive (Tanabe et al. 
2007). 
3. Research hypotheses 
By matching recent research in cognitive science with that on retail investors and volatility, 
it is possible to put forward a series of research hypotheses on the expected nature, 
prevalence and general effects of gambling on DC pension schemes and the effect of such 
behaviour on stock market volatility. 
A compulsive gambler is, by definition, less constrained by risk and reward than someone 
who gambles occasionally. The evidence suggests that younger men are more likely to 
gamble than older men, and that men are more likely to be successful gamblers than 
women, particularly in the initial stages of a gambling episode. Age, gender, family 
circumstances and income are correlated with the propensity to gamble more than normal, 
but the efficacy of socio-economic characteristics driving a gambling attitude is not 
immediately obvious (cf. Kumar 2009: 1890). Studies on compulsive behaviour in the fields 
of cognitive science and psychology reveal several crucial insights, or predictions, about 
patterns of gambling over time. These insights underwrite the empirical logic of our article. 
For example, compulsive gamblers: 
 seek out environments in which they can express their predisposition to take risks, hence 
they prefer a volatile stock market over one with low volatility; 
 act sequentially, stringing together successive bets until something stops them, which 
means that the interval between successive bets is small and can shrink over time; 
 value risk taking rather than calibrating risk and reward, thus negating the need for a 
relationship between actions taken and their consequences; and 
 are more likely to be men than women, are younger rather than older adults, and are 
more likely to lose than win in games of chance over a sequence of bets. 
The distinction between taking a risk and gambling becomes particularly important when, at 
first sight, it might look as if the object of analysis concerns one action rather than a string of 
related ones. Hence, we are especially interested in identifying individuals who make 
successive, as opposed to one or two, bets before they stop. The findings of cognitive 
science and psychology are consistent with distinguishing between high and low frequencies 
of trading and they provide us with a means of classifying, if not categorically distinguishing 
between, risk-taking behaviour within a DC saving and investment environment. They also 
give us an opportunity to match the initiation of trading with compulsive behaviour and 
changes in the stock market environment. In other words, we expect market volatility to 
prompt thrill-seekers to enter the market via their DC savings accounts. 
Overall, one can draw four distinct research hypotheses with the correspondent testable 
implications: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): some pension-plan participants are noisy traders and some of these show 
a gambling-like behavioural pattern. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): participants produce and feed off volatility in what we deem to be a 
bidirectional relationship. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): market players who show a gambling-like behavioural pattern mainly 
determine the relationship between volatility and trading activity. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): since socioeconomic and personal characteristics and their interactions 
are what determine gambling-like behaviour, a longer time horizon and saving-for-
retirement decision-making framework have no effect on the socioeconomic drivers of 
gambling behaviour in the context of a standard investor problem. 
4. Data, methods and models 
4.1. Data and sample scheme 
Mercer (UK) and its human resources consulting (HRC) branch supplied the data on 
individual behaviour in the DC environment.4 This firm provides advisory services to private 
and public entities, as well as to the managers of defined-contribution (DC) and defined-
benefit (DB) pension schemes.Our initial database included the personal details and 
transaction records of 17,690 people (‘participants’) across 19 pension schemes, which were 
tracked from 2002 to 2012. As Table I (a) shows, the spread of participants and transactions 
between the schemes is uneven, with 52 per cent of the platform population and 60 per 
cent of transactions concentrated in three (non-overlapping) schemes. Mercer provided the 
data in separate files with a unique identifier available only at a scheme level. The 
meagreness of the information on the participants and their employers made it impossible 
to quantify the risk of observations overlapping across schemes, so we decided to present 
our empirical analysis in two stages. In the first, we analysed (i) the whole database with all 
the schemes pooled together; (ii) the three most representative schemes (BBB, HHH and 
MMM), comprising roughly 52 per cent of the overall data, pooled together and henceforth 
named macro-scheme; and (iii) each scheme singularly. We could thus exploit the full 
potential of the information in the database and control for the possible risk of overlapping 
observations. In this article, we present the results for the whole database, for the macro-
scheme, and for the most representative scheme ‘MMM’ (henceforth ‘sample scheme’). All 
the other results are available in our online Appendix A. When, in the second stage of our 
analysis, we turn our attention to the behavioural drivers of compulsive gambling, the 
structure of the data forces us to focus the analysis on the sample scheme – the algorithm 
of estimation failed to converge on any plausible solution with the other representative 
schemes and different sorts of aggregations. Nevertheless, the sample scheme is the largest 
one and it accounts for roughly 27 per cent of the active participants and 21 per cent of the 
transactions.  
[Insert Table I About Here] 
In terms of activity, 59.21 per cent of the participants in the sample scheme (or 1,993 
individuals) made at least one transaction over the period; the remaining 40 per cent, 
possibly exhibiting Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s (1988) status quo bias, were not active in 
any way. For the behavioural analysis, we chose to focus only on the sample scheme, for the 
low number of active participants in other schemes not only makes it difficult to reach 
convergence in the algorithms of estimation but also undermines the reliability and 
robustness of the results. This does not apply to the analysis of frequency and volatility, 
where the higher number of participants involved and the focus on quantitative rather than 
qualitative drivers makes the risk of potential bias less harmful. In our view, this empirical 
strategy is optimal if we are to exploit the full potential of the information in the database 
yet ensure a sufficient level of reliability and robustness of the analysis. 
A simple recognition of its characteristics shows how the data base has a fairly good 
gender balance (Table II (a)) with a slight majority of men (61.68 per cent for the pooled 
sample and 54.78 per cent for the sample scheme). The average investor enters the scheme 
at a relatively young age (35 and 31 years respectively), has on average been in it for a 
considerable length of time (22 and 29 years respectively), but on average has less 
experience with the firm in question (7 and 12 years). 
[Insert Table II About Here] 
Since a gambler is somebody who is unable to resist the urge to gamble, we divided our 
sample into two drivers – number of transactions and their frequency. We recorded the 
number of dealings each person made and noted the number of months (elapsed time) 
between two successive transactions. We then defined the frequency of transactions as the 
inverse of the elapsed time (frequency = 1/elapsed time) and divided both the distributions 
of the number of transactions and their frequency into quartiles. Finally, we focused on the 
upper and lower quartile of each distribution and, through observing their combination, 
identified three behavioural patterns among the participants: 
 ‘quiet’: lower quartile for number of transactions and frequency; 
 ’mixed’: lower quartile for number of transaction and higher for frequency or vice versa; 
 ‘gamblers’: upper quartile for both number and frequency of transactions.  
Table II (b) shows the distribution of these types of participants across the schemes in 
absolute and percentage terms. Some 30.15 per cent of those in the pooled database fitted 
the mixed category, 3.55 per cent were in the quiet category and an estimated 8.80 per cent 
were gamblers. These results are consistent with those of the sample scheme in which the 
mixed, quiet and gambler participants accounted for 36.79, 10.90 and 11.49 per cent 
respectively. 
Since compulsive gamblers tend to lack control in the presence of risk and reward, we 
also sought to determine whether increasing market volatility affected (or even prompted) 
changes in the volume of transactions and their frequency. Figure 1 displays the monthly 
market volatility (high and low) of the FTSE 100 index over the period between 2002 and 
2012, along with the responses of the new active participants for both the macro and 
sample schemes. A visual inspection suggests a lagged positive relationship for both, which 
therefore makes it a subject for further investigation. One should also note that the macro 
scheme registered abnormal dynamics in the year between February 2010 and February 
2011: a closer inspection of the figures, however, suggests that this might be attributable to 
a company action, such as restructuring the schemes. 
[Insert Figure 1 About Here]  
4.2. Gamblers: a robustness check 
The correct identification of gamblers is central to the paper. We, therefore performed a 
robustness check of this behavioural pattern, as defined in the previous section, based on 
two issues: the characteristics of the trades coming from gamblers and their activity during 
periods of up and down trend in the market. We aimed to show how the behaviour of those 
we labelled ‘gamblers’ is consistent with the expectations of the standard literature on 
gambling. In particular, we focused on two characteristics – the tendency to increase their 
commitment during downtrends (the gambler’s ruin) and the scant attention to standard 
risk considerations. The results were encouraging (see the online Appendix B for further 
details): we found an increase of 10 per cent in the trading from gamblers in periods of 
downtrend with respect to period of uptrends, signalling the ‘gamblers’ ruin’ behaviour. 
Moreover, we found that the clear majority of the operations done by gamblers consisted of 
switching between two funds with the same risk profile (44.83 per cent), thus suggesting a 
need to act rather than a true portfolio rebalancing. Finally, we found that, when looking 
specifically to the switching operations coming from gamblers (in the representative 
scheme), the tendency to increase the activity during periods of downtrend is confirmed 
and its magnitude is even bigger. The encouraging results confirmed the robustness of our 
identification procedure and led us to go on with our empirical analysis of the correlation 
between gambling attitude and volatility. 
4.3. Models and testable implications 
As mentioned earlier, we present our empirical analysis in two stages. In the first, we 
investigate the actions of participants to establish whether there is any relationship 
between volatility in the stock market and the role of those showing a gambling-like 
behavioural pattern. Then, in the second, to understand the drivers behind their activities, 
we examine the association between the participants’ trading behaviour and their personal 
and socio-economic characteristics. 
Focusing on hypotheses H1 and H2, we test for the existence of a positive and statistically 
significant correlation between the number of participants each month making their first 
transaction (henceforth new active participants) and the volatility of the stock market. Like 
Foucault et al. (2011), we first use a sample, but unlike them, we want to assess the inverse 
relationship between retail activity and volatility. Consequently, we use a simple OLS with 
the following specification: 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  [Equation 1] 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑡 is the number of new active participants in that month (time t), as a proxy for 
the trading activity. Like Foucault et al. (2011), we too are aware of the endogeneity 
between the dependent and independent variables and that this can bias the estimation, 
but it also has two main advantages. It is a useful starting point for further analysis and it 
allows us to switch the dependent and independent variable to focus on the feedback of 
volatility, which is our real angle of interest. As a further step in the analysis, looking at 
monthly lags of up to six months, we calculate a correlation matrix between the new active 
participants and market volatility and we do the same for the returns. The reason for 
choosing to investigate the importance of lagged volatility and returns lies in the cognitive 
research: compulsive gamblers look for excitement, so they play repeatedly, irrespective of 
the payoff structure. In a market setting, this means being ‘drawn into’ a casino-like 
environment, with little (if any) role given to the returns. As in the IGT, the player, 
potentially a compulsive gambler, ‘learns’ about the environment and reacts, which implies 
a link with a realized condition of the market (namely lagged volatility and returns).  
Hypothesis H3 looks at the leading role of gamblers in driving trading activity, which one 
can translate into their behaviour being the most likely explanation for the variability of the 
database. To test this implication, we performed a principal component analysis (PCA) 
based on the three behavioural patterns of trading defined in the previous section – quiet 
participants, mixed participants and gamblers. To perform the PCA we make the standard 
assumptions that: 
 the three types of participants describe the whole database (linearity); 
 mean and variance have a primary (sufficient in statistical terms) role in defining the 
characteristics of the database (mean and covariance); and 
 large rather than small variances are important (large variance). 
As a further test, we run an interquantile regression with the following specification: 
𝐼𝑄𝑅𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  [Equation 2] 
where IQR is the interquantile range at time t, defined as the difference between the 
ninetieth and tenth percentile of the distribution of the monthly number of new active 
participants and 𝛽0𝐿𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡  is the lagged volatility in the stock market at time t. 
Compulsive gambling is an ‘extreme’ trading behaviour that the potentiality of high gains 
and losses triggers. As such, we would expect lagged volatility to lead not only the trading 
activity, but also its ‘polarization’, that is the increased distance between upper and lower 
extreme forms of behaviour, which are supposed to react in an opposite way to changed 
market conditions.  
We then try to establish who is leading the trading activity: to do this, we estimate the 
correlation between the monthly number of new active participants and the lagged 
volatility for each of three behavioural patterns – gambler, mixed and quiet. As for H1 we 
use a simple OLS with the following specification: 
𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡   𝑗 = 1,2,3  [Equation 3] 
where 𝑇𝐴𝑗𝑡 is the trading activity at time t for the 𝑗 type of participant and 𝑗 is equeal to 1 
when the participant is ‘quiet’, 2 when it is ‘mixed’ and 3 when it is a ‘gambler’. Finally, we 
turn our attention to hypothesis H4 to address the role of ‘contextual’ (Simon 1956) 
variables in driving gambling behaviour. To exploit fully the heterogeneity of trading 
behavioural patterns, and to increase the efficiency of the estimation, we give further 
attention to the types of participants. Our primary purpose is to decrease variability within, 
but to increase it between, the groups, to eradicate as much statistical (and behavioural) 
noise as possible. We then combined the quartiles of the number and frequency of the 
active participants’ transactions (the reciprocal of the time between two consecutive 
transactions), which yielded the following five types of participant: 
 ‘dormant’: up to one transaction in the whole period; 
 ‘quiet’: few transactions at low frequency; 
 ‘emotional’: few transactions with high frequency; 
 ‘steady’: many transactions and low frequency; and 
 ‘gamblers’: many transactions and high frequency. 
We then focused on the effect of the participants’ socio-economic and personal 
characteristics on the probability of them belonging to each of the five types and behaving 
accordingly. To do this, and in keeping with the nature of the data, we chose to estimate a 
multinomial logit model with the following general formulation: 
𝑙𝑛 𝛺𝑚|𝑏(𝑥) = 𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑚|𝑥)
𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑏|𝑥)
= 𝑥𝛽𝑚|𝑥   𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝐽 
where b is the base category (reference group) that acts as a benchmark to assess the log-
probability of all the others and x is a vector of covariates, which, in our case, is made up of 
age, gender, experience in the scheme (number of years), experience in the company 
(number of years), average transaction value (£), fund chosen within the scheme and fixed 
effects for the calendar year. We chose the largest one (the dormant participants) as the 
base category because this is standard practice and because, given the structural 
characteristics of this model, the results are not going to change with a different choice. It is 
possible to solve the general formulation to obtain the J-1 equations of the predicted 
probabilities of belonging to the correspondent J-1 categories: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 𝑚|𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝛽𝑚|𝑏)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝛽𝑗|𝑏)
𝐽
𝑗=1
  [Equation 4] 
In our case, we have five categories (m=5) and we estimate 4 equations for the predicted 
probabilities. We present and discuss the results of our empirical analysis in the following 
section. 
5. Results 
We start testing the correlation between the number of the new active participants and the 
volatility in the stock market. Table III (a) shows the correlation coefficients for the sample 
scheme and the first six lags of the volatility. 
[Insert Table III About Here] 
As expected, we only found significant relationships for lagged values (lag 1, 2 and 6); we 
see this as a sign that a group of DC plan participants sought out opportunities to express 
their gambling instincts. The result holds across the schemes and the estimation of Equation 
1 for the database confirms the absence of any correlation by or for either the macro or 
sample schemes (Table III (b)). The correlation matrix between the number of new active 
participants and the returns provides a weaker and less stable relationship across the 
schemes (see online Appendix A for the full range of results). Hypotheses H1 and H2 are, 
then, confirmed as transacting in a market environment characterized by volatility, which is 
evidence of excitement-seeking with no clear link to the returns. The relationship between 
market volatility and trading activity could, however, be more complex than expected. 
Drawing from Hypothesis 3, we focus on which type of participant (if any) is leading the 
trading activity. Table IV shows the results of a principal component analysis (PCA) aimed at 
investigating which is the most representative component (type of trader) for the whole 
database, for the macro-scheme and for the sample scheme respectively. The PCA 
reorganizes the database around its components and points out how many and which 
among them are best suited to ‘lead’, that is they are statistically sufficient to represent the 
variability of the database itself. We chose components that presented an eigenvalue of the 
covariance matrix higher than 1. 
[Insert Table IV About Here] 
As Table IV shows, gamblers are always the most meaningful component; they have a value 
of 1.6723 for the whole database, of 1.8057 for the macro-scheme and of 1.6596 for the 
sample scheme; the same holds true across all the schemes singularly (see online Appendix 
A). The column headed ‘Proportion’ shows the share of information ‘explained’ by the 
correspondent component: according to our analysis, gamblers alone account for 55.74 per 
cent, 60.19 per cent and 55.32 per cent of the overall variability of trading activity. They 
literally lead the group’s activity, thus confirming our expectations on Hypothesis 3. We 
investigate this bidirectional relationship further by turning our attention to Equations 2 and 
3. First, to check if the role of new active participants can explain the activity spread, we 
estimate the relationship between the interquantile range of their number and the lagged 
volatility. 
[Insert Table V About Here] 
Table V (a) contains the results for the whole database, as well as for the macro and 
sample schemes: when pooled together, the schemes fail to show a significant relationship, 
but at a scheme level most do (see online Appendix A). The estimation of Equation 3, 
namely how well the lagged volatility explains the activity of each type of participant, helps 
us to understanding better the nature of the relationship. As Table V (b) shows, a 
relationship does exist between a specific type of trader and lagged volatility, but for the 
most representative scheme it only holds for the gamblers. 
What drives the gamblers’ behaviour in a saving-for-retirement framework? Do investor 
gamblers behave differently in a more standard environment? We estimate [Equation 4] to 
answer this type of question. As personal characteristics, we use the age of the participants 
on joining the scheme and their gender, whereas experience in the scheme and firm are, 
respectively, proxies for both improving skills in managing the technicalities of making 
transactions and for the peer effect (intended as increasing exposure to the average 
behaviour). We added yearly fixed effects to capture common time trends and standard 
errors. Finally, testing for multicollinearity, we estimated the variance inflation factor (VIF). 
Its maximum value of 3.49 for the yearly controls suggests that the level is acceptable, and 
that multicollinearity is not an issue (Chatterjee et al. 2000). 
Table VI shows the marginal effects for each variable at the mean values of all the others, 
as well as the predicted probabilities in each behavioural pattern. We display these 
probabilities in the first row of each category of outcome and are close to the actual 
correspondent sample shares (the extremes are easier to capture). Dormant trading is the 
single most likely outcome, conditioned to the mean value of the explanatory variables, with 
a predicted probability of 78.93 per cent, whereas compulsive gamblers have a 9.83 per 
cent chance. 
[Insert Table VI About Here] 
In general, age at enrolment is a significant factor in two of the five behavioural patterns 
(the marginal ones). Similarly, gender is statistically significant for marginal behaviour and 
for those identified as ‘emotional’ participants, whereas the average size of transaction adds 
a significant factor to the ‘steady’ participants. Our proxies for skill and the exposure effect 
are relevant in triggering emotional and compulsive gambling behaviour; this may indicate 
that exposure to ‘average behaviour’ in a plan only affects behaviour at the margin (cf. 
Beshears et al. 2015). 
Focusing on the latter pattern, our results show how the direction and magnitude of the 
marginal effects are consistent with our expectations. Gender is very important in driving 
compulsive gambling: being male increases the likelihood of gambling behaviour by 17.58 
per cent and is the single most crucial factor. The size of the bet (average transaction value), 
though statistically significant, has a relatively small effect, thereby confirming the 
experimental evidence suggesting that an individual’s background characteristics condition 
this effect (Clark et al. 2009). On the other hand, stage in the life cycle affects the probability 
of compulsive gambling; it is significant at 10 per cent and with a small effect (0.20 per 
cent): an increase in the age at enrolment increases the likelihood of acting compulsively. In 
the light of the life-cycle hypothesis, enrolling one year later could proxy a built-in wealth 
effect, thus exerting a positive influence on acting compulsively. By contrast, the role that 
experience plays in both the scheme and the company is highly significant and non-
negligible. The two effects are similar in magnitude but point in opposite directions. Longer 
experience in the scheme increases the probability of overconfidence and hyperactivity 
(+1.27 per cent), whereas prolonged exposure to average behaviour (experience in the 
company) acts in the opposite way by smoothing the dynamics of marginal outcomes (–1.29 
per cent). The interaction between these two competing forces is worthy of deeper insight 
and is best performed graphically.  
As shown in Figure 2 (a) to (d), we focus on experience in the company and in the 
scheme, but also provide insights into the role of life cycle and average transaction value. 
[Insert Figure 2 About Here] 
According to our results, gender mediates the interaction between the life cycle effect 
and average transaction value (Figure 2 (a)): the higher the transaction value, the weaker 
the effect of age at enrolment, but the flatter slope of the highest average transaction value 
suggests a curbing of the gender effect when the stakes are relevant. Figure 2 (b), by 
contrast, shows the interaction effect between experience in the scheme and average 
transaction value. Here, the dispersion among the various categories of average transaction 
value is higher; again, relevant stakes dampen the interaction effect, which gender only 
weakly mediates. Figure 2 (c) shows the interaction effect between life cycle and increased 
skill. Gender mediates the interaction effect, which is higher for men. Women, on the other 
hand, have a more homogeneous response, but men have a higher dispersion in response 
across age cohorts. Finally, Figure 2 (d) shows that the interaction between experience in 
the scheme and in the company draws a slightly more complex picture of the average effect 
assessed in the analysis of the margins. Here, prolonged exposure to the same working 
environment completely offsets the positive effect of higher skills in being a compulsive 
gambler. When the exposure effect is lower, increased skill effects response, which is 
remarkably higher for men than for women. By contrast, when experience in the company is 
lower, the slope flattens to exhibit a weakening of the gender effect. Nonetheless, the 
relative magnitude is reversed: the effect is higher for women than for men. In other words, 
when not dampened by prolonged exposure to average behaviour, the effect of increased 
technical confidence is higher for women than men. We interpret this result as a ‘catch-up 
effect’ for women who start from lower levels of self-confidence. The results of our 
multinomial logit analysis are consistent with those of the standard literature on investor 
behaviour. This then verifies Hypothesis H4, with the implication that it is not possible to 
make the case for a specificity of the behavioural drivers of the decision-making process of 
investors acting in a saving-for-retirement framework. Policy makers should focus on what 
technically makes an investment problem in a retirement framework different from an 
investment problem in a standard framework – for example, longer time horizons, the risk 
of longevity, or the co-called annuity puzzle. 
Our study identified about 10 per cent of UK DC plan participants as compulsive 
gamblers. Given the findings of cognitive science and psychology, which commonly report 
that about 5 per cent of tested subjects are compulsive gamblers, this seems a large 
number. Although our sample scheme is representative of the schemes that Mercer (UK) 
administers, it may not be representative of the population at large. Nonetheless, given the 
distinctive nature of laboratory-based testing, the characteristics of test subjects (who are 
often undergraduate or graduate students), and the artificial circumstances in which test 
subjects perform, compulsive gambling could be higher in environments such as financial 
markets than hitherto assumed (Shiller 2005). 
It is known that the probability of being a compulsive gambler is gender-related and that 
men are more likely than women to be compulsive gamblers. Among those labelled as 
compulsive gamblers, the distribution of men is more compact (homogeneous) than that of 
women (heterogeneous) – men are men (Barber and Odean 2001), whereas women are 
sometimes like men but otherwise not like men.  
Life cycle also plays a role; this matches similar findings in cognitive science and 
psychology where the effect of age is inconsistent (comparing young people with middle-
aged people and with much older people): enrolling one year later increases the probability 
of acting compulsively by revealing what we interpret as a proxy for a built-in wealth effect 
easing compulsive behaviour. Conversely, the average value of a transaction, though 
statistically significant, has a small effect on the probability of being a compulsive gambler. 
Here, the higher the average value of a transaction, the lower the likelihood of the person 
concerned being a gambler. There are several possible interpretations for this result. For 
example, investors could be playing the game, that is transacting in a volatile market, for the 
excitement, but subject to self-imposed limits on the value of any transaction in a sequence 
of transactions. Another interpretation might be that, in seeking excitement, compulsive 
gamblers intuitively recognize that the ‘cost of playing the game’ is to put in play some 
portion of their account. In other words, they use their DC account like pin money in a card 
game. That participants tend not to gamble on large-value transactions is less important 
than the pattern of transacting in relationship to market volatility. 
There is considerable interest in whether peer effects are important for individual 
savings’ behaviour (Beshears et al. 2015). The cognitive science and psychology literature, 
however, holds that learning from others is always less significant than learning from the 
consequences of one’s own behaviour (Yu and Zhou 2006). In this respect, and focusing on 
the interaction between experience in the scheme (years of trading) and in the firm (years 
of service), we found that the former increases the probability of being a compulsive 
gambler, whereas the latter completely offsets that effect.  
Overall, as the literature on overconfidence confirms, being male increases the effect of 
experience in the scheme and the value of the transaction on the probability of being a 
compulsive gambler. Conversely, there is a positive association between being a woman and 
taking the value of the transaction into account when gambling. This is consistent with 
women being more cautious than men even if they are drawn to the excitement of 
gambling, which is widely noted in the psychology and behavioural literature.5 There is one 
exception to the association between gender and increased skill and this is when seniority in 
the company is low. In this case, being more skilled has a bigger effect on women than men, 
possibly signalling a catch-up effect on self-confidence. 
It is important to note, however, that the gender effect fades with age. In our sample, in 
relation to their propensity to gamble, men and women tend to behave more like one 
another as they get older. In other words, both older men and older women are less likely to 
be compulsive gamblers. At one level, this is a pleasing result. As men and women age, the 
prospect of retirement looms larger and their welfare in retirement is more salient. As 
suggested elsewhere, ‘salience’ is a key issue when people come to plan for their retirement 
(Clark et al. 2012). The implication is entirely straightforward: the costs and consequences 
of being a compulsive gambler are more obvious at an older age, when retirement is the 
relevant consideration. At another level, this is not an entirely encouraging result because 
some younger people, mostly men but also some women, value excitement over a remote 
future state of being, which they can only observe in others rather than directly experience 
themselves. Either way, they are myopic (Becker and Murphy 1988; Laibson 2003). 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
Many people gamble without threatening their long-term well-being. To gamble is to take a 
risk rather than make a calculated decision informed by knowledge and understanding of 
the payoffs of the various options. In this respect, we focused on compulsive gamblers, 
namely those UK DC participants who fell within the upper quartile in terms of both the 
number and frequency of their transactions. We also analysed behavioural patterns of 
trading and their determinants.  
Since our aim in this article was to contribute to the academic debate on compulsive and 
marginal behaviour, to help the financial industry better understand the needs of its clients, 
and to assist policy makers, we based our study of compulsive behaviour on the supposition 
that individual identity is less important than cognitive predisposition. By implication, we 
might expect that people who gamble in a DC pension environment are a random mix of 
men and women, young and old, competent and incompetent. In fact, studies conducted by 
cognitive scientists and psychologists suggest that men tend to gamble more than women, 
that men are more effective gamblers than women, and that the predisposition to gamble is 
particular to an individual, although observing the behaviour of others can make a 
difference. In this respect, we found that being male with an elevated level of technical 
competence enhances the probability of acting compulsively. By contrast, seniority in the 
firm and the transaction being of a higher than average value decrease this likelihood, even 
although we noted a remarkable richness in the interactions among these drivers of 
behaviour and these findings were consistent with our expectations. 
If we assume that the financial industry indeed wishes to improve the services it supplies 
to its clients, our research finding that compulsive gambling is commonplace in DC pension 
schemes, albeit not shared by the ‘average’ investor, might help plan managers decide what 
policies to pursue. The simplest way forward and one that honours the principle of respect 
for individual volition, would be to do nothing other than inform all participants of the costs 
and consequences of compulsive behaviour. However, given the evidence that advice 
facilities are under-utilized, and that there is a high degree of inertia and low financial 
literacy among participants, a better targeted (even tailored) service could improve the 
sector’s overall performance, which in turn would have a positive impact on social welfare. 
There are several ways in which to do this, some more effective than others. However, 
given that compulsive gambling involves individuals who discount self-governance, it seems 
unlikely that appealing to their self-interest would dampen their thirst for excitement. 
Another way of dealing with the issue would be through properly tailored policy measures 
to nudge people into a decision-making environment with structured choices that limit 
opportunities for compulsive gambling (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Even if effective for the 
majority, it is unlikely to work for those who actively seek opportunities to gamble. Some 
authors have suggested channelling active participants through a series of gates and hurdles 
that take them into risk and return environments that require higher levels of skill and 
expertise (Clark and Urwin 2011). One could require those who are predisposed to be active 
and who seek excitement to demonstrate a level of competence consistent with the 
possible costs and consequences of their actions. To reinforce the screening effects of a 
gates-and-hurdles regime, one could place limits on a participant’s initial bets that permit 
excitement but contain any losses. Screening devices could allow the managers of DC 
schemes to identify those whose behaviour may require a level of oversight wasted on the 
average participant. While any gates-and-hurdles regime is likely to be paternalistic, in 
circumstances where participating in workplace DC schemes is important for long-term well-
being, there is a public interest in dissuading compulsive gamblers from treating pension 
investments as they would other forms of gambling. In this respect, our article contributes 
to the debate on finding an optimal design for policy rules to support the financial decision-
making of those who are ill-equipped to act in their own long-term self-interest. In our 
estimation, roughly 10 per cent of the population engages in ‘compulsive gambling 
behaviour’: this is marginal, but not negligible. Being able to characterize the nature and 
magnitude of the link between personal and socio-economic drivers and making financial 
choices is extremely important if we are optimally to frame a system of policy rules. For 
instance, growing imbalances in the gender/age composition of the population, if combined 
with an extended period of high volatility in the stock market, could trigger semi-automatic 
stabilizers for long-term asset managers. To understand fully the significance of our 
analytical framework and the results we have obtained from it, it is necessary to take 
several issues into account. One is the possibility that a selection bias may be embedded in 
the data. If, as research on addiction and gambling suggests, an indicator of ‘problem’ 
gambling is compulsive behaviour, then it is possible that our sample inadequately 
represents that portion of the population for whom this problem has negatively impacted 
on their ability to hold down a job.  
Reinforcing this issue is another concern: we have been unable to observe the 
background characteristics of participants who exhibit compulsive behaviour. It may be that 
rising incomes and house-price appreciation have more than offset the long-term costs (if 
there are any) of gambling on the UK stock market through one’s participation in a DC 
pension scheme. 
Finally, there is a caveat to this type of study, widely acknowledged in the field but 
difficult to overcome. By the age of 30, many DC pension plan participants are in a relatively 
stable relationship with another person. Typically, this other person does not have the same 
employer nor, necessarily, the same kind of income and retirement benefits. While we 
should be cautious about attributing too much to household behaviour, some households 
pursue collective or joint savings strategies in which one partner pursues a more cautious 
approach to investment than the other. In some cases, one partner may be in a relatively 
low paid job, but with a high likelihood of continuity of tenure with (perhaps) a DB pension 
scheme, whereas the other may have a succession of highly paid jobs accompanied by DC 
pension benefits. In effect, one partner’s high-risk DC investment strategy may appear to be 
consistent with compulsive gambling, but the other’s low-risk saving strategy deliberately 
offsets it (Clark et al. 2012). 
These three caveats are significant, although each is a challenge in terms of how we 
might design a research strategy that combines administrative databases with detailed 
knowledge of individuals’ background circumstances and opportunities. One way forward 
would be to set up field experiments and test the impact of these factors. Even so, given the 
moral opprobrium attached to addiction, gambling and substance abuse, we doubt that this 
type of framework would resolve the issues as identified above. 
Notes 
1. In this article we use the expressions ‘pension plan participants’, ‘investors’, ‘market players’, ‘traders’ and 
‘employees’ equivalently. 
2. Stanovich (2010: 79) notes that some ‘people see links between events in the past and events in the future 
when the two are really independent’. Pathological gamblers justify their actions to themselves and others 
by acting as if their beliefs are indicative of a higher level of understanding that neophytes do not share. 
3. The Iowa gambling task (IGT), designed to deal with patients with pre-frontal brain lesions, has become the 
standard test for determining who is prone to gamble. 
4. In November 2014, Mercer, a global consulting company, had more than 20,000 employees based in more 
than 40 countries and an excess of US$ 108 billion in assets under management. For further details, see 
www.uk.mercer.com 
5. See, among others, Charness and Gneezy (2012). 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1 – Number of new active participants and stock market volatility (monthly): Macro-Scheme 
and Sample Scheme ‘MMM’ 
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Figure 2 – Multinomial logit analysis of participants’ behaviour: interaction effects 
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Tables 
Table I – Composition of the schemes: number of transactions and participants (total number, 
active, inactive and by types) 
a) - Number of participants across the schemes 
  
Scheme code Transactions Participants (active and inactive) 
  # of transactions % of the total 
# of individuals 
in the scheme 
% of the total 
BBB 65,296 4.21 2,961 16.74 
CCC 120,772 7.78 949 5.36 
DDD 19,715 1.27 665 3.76 
EEE 49,318 3.18 336 1.9 
GGG 965 0.06 226 1.28 
HHH 299,915 19.33 3,027 17.11 
III 14,331 0.92 319 1.8 
KKK 10,237 0.66 269 1.52 
LLL 24,566 1.58 213 1.2 
MMM 326,316 21.03 3,368 19.04 
NNN 14,599 0.94 108 0.61 
OOO 133,396 8.6 577 3.26 
PPP 5,694 0.37 48 0.27 
QQQ 1,443 0.09 357 2.02 
RRR 16,636 1.07 233 1.32 
SSS 88,124 5.68 1,059 5.99 
TTT 30,809 1.99 618 3.49 
YYY 301,473 19.43 1,524 8.62 
ZZZ 28,014 1.81 833 4.71 
 
b) - Number of participants making transactions across all the schemes (by type) 
         Scheme 
code 
Gamblers Mixed Participants Quiet Participants 
Total active 
participants 
Total inactive 
participants 
  
# of 
individuals 
% of the 
total 
# of 
individuals 
% of the 
total 
# of 
individuals 
% of the 
total 
  
   
 
      
  
  
 BBB 250 8.44 739 24.96 44 1.49 1,033 1,928 
CCC 227 23.92 683 71.97 33 3.48 943 6 
DDD 10 1.50 36 5.41 7 1.05 53 612 
EEE 82 24.40 249 74.11 4 1.19 335 1 
GGG 6 2.65 4 1.77 24 10.62 34 192 
HHH 234 7.73 883 29.17 51 1.68 1,168 1,859 
III 25 7.84 155 48.59 19 5.96 199 120 
KKK 27 10.04 52 19.33 2 0.74 81 188 
LLL 49 23.00 155 72.77 7 3.29 211 2 
MMM 387 11.49 1,239 36.79 367 10.90 1,993 1,375 
NNN 20 18.52 70 64.81 1 0.93 91 17 
OOO 29 5.03 152 26.34 9 1.56 190 387 
PPP 1 2.08 5 10.42 1 2.08 7 41 
QQQ 0 0.00 3 0.84 14 3.92 17 340 
RRR 0 0.00 39 16.74 1 0.43 40 193 
SSS 57 5.38 248 23.42 53 5.00 358 701 
TTT 56 9.06 85 13.75 55 8.90 196 422 
YYY 89 5.84 375 24.61 10 0.66 474 1,050 
ZZZ 2 0.24 58 6.96 30 3.60 90 743 
 
  
Table II – Descriptive statistics of the whole database and of the sample scheme 'MMM' 
a) - Descriptive statistics for the whole database 
    
 
     
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Female (%) 17689 38.32 0.49 2 3 
Joining age (years) 17176 35.31 10.48 16 69 
Experience in the company (years) 14783 7.13 9.39 0 48 
Experience in the scheme (years) 9415 22.07 14.43 0 61 
Per capita transactions (#) 321484 783.91 610.92 1 4304 
Average transaction value (£) 321484 13244.30 14783.70 0 1287355 
Average elapsed time between 
consecutive transactions (months) 
317229 1.22 0.43 1 13.80 
 
b) - Descriptive statistics for the sample scheme 'MMM' 
    
            
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
  
Female (%) 3368 45.25 0.50 2 3 
Joining age (years) 3001 30.99 8.25 16 67 
Experience in the company (years) 2933 12.30 13.15 0 46 
Experience in the scheme (years) 2207 28.90 10.05 0 49 
Per capita transactions (#) 78396 326.04 388.58 1 1974 
Average transaction value (£) 78396 24893.60 36464.63 0 1302690 
Average elapsed time between 
consecutive transactions (months) 
76397 1.13 0.96 1 29.00 
            
 
  
Table III – Correlation between participants making the first transaction and market volatility 
a) Pairwise correlation coefficients of the number of participants making their first transaction and market volatility 
(monthly) - Sample Scheme 
 
# new active 
participants 
Market 
Volatility 
Market 
Volatility 
(lag 1) 
Market 
Volatility 
(lag 2) 
Market 
Volatility 
(lag 3) 
Market 
Volatility 
(lag 4) 
Market 
Volatility 
(lag 5) 
Market 
Volatility 
(lag 6) 
# new active participants 
1 
       
130 
       
         
Market Volatility 
0.1652 1 
      
0.0613 
       
129 129 
      
         
Market Volatility (lag 1) 
0.2711* 0.6059* 1 
     
0.002 0 
      
128 128 128 
     
         
Market Volatility (lag 2) 
0.2656* 0.4893* 0.6048* 1 
    
0.0025 0 0 
     
127 127 127 127 
    
         
Market Volatility (lag 3) 
0.119 0.3674* 0.4869* 0.6038* 1 
   
0.1843 0 0 0 
    
126 126 126 126 126 
   
         
Market Volatility (lag 4) 
0.0756 0.2450* 0.3647* 0.4855* 0.6024* 1 
  
0.4021 0.0059 0 0 0 
   
125 125 125 125 125 125 
  
         
Market Volatility (lag 5) 
-0.036 0.2269* 0.2453* 0.3648* 0.4861* 0.6030* 1 
 
0.6916 0.0113 0.006 0 0 0 
  
124 124 124 124 124 124 124 
 
         
Market Volatility (lag 6) 
-0.1853* 0.2702* 0.2312* 0.2478* 0.3684* 0.4897* 0.6038* 1 
0.0402 0.0025 0.0101 0.0057 0 0 0 
 
123 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.051  *** p<0.01 
b) - Simple OLS regression of the number of new active members and market volatility (monthly): Sample Scheme in red 
   
  
  
TOTAL 
Sample 
Macro-
Scheme 
Scheme 
MMM 
   
  
Market Volatility 58.55 74.74 51.68 
 
(85.59) (57.98) (27.38) 
 
  
  
Constant 52.29*** 25.36*** 10.08*** 
  (7.852) (5.319) (2.511) 
 
  
  
Observations 129 129 129 
Adjusted R-squared -0.004 0.005 0.020 
   
  
Standard errors in parentheses,  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001 
Source: authors' calculation on Mercer's data 
  
Table IV – Principal Component Analysis - Eigenvalues and proportion of explained variation 
explained by each component 
 
Whole database 
     
 
Principal components Number of obs 130 
   
  
Number of comp. 3 
   
  
Trace 3 
   
 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho 1 
   
       
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
 
       
 
Gamblers 1.6723 0.8721 55.74% 55.74% 
 
 
Mixed Participants 0.8002 0.2726 26.67% 82.42% 
 
 
Quiet Participants 0.5275 . 17.58% 100.00% 
 
 
          
 
  
    
 
 
Macro-Scheme 
     
 
Principal components Number of obs 130 
   
  
Number of comp. 3 
   
  
Trace 3 
   
 
Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho 1 
   
       
 
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
 
       
 
Gamblers 1.8057 0.8655 60.19% 60.19% 
 
 
Mixed Participants 0.9402 0.6861 31.34% 91.53% 
 
 
Quiet Participants 0.2541 . 8.47% 100.00% 
 
 
          
 
  
    
 
 
Sample Scheme MMM     
   Principal components/correlation Number of obs 125 
  
  
  
 
Number of comp. 3 
  
  
  
 
Trace 3 
  
  
  Rotation: (unrotated = principal) Rho 1 
  
  
  
     
  
  Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative   
  
     
  
  Gamblers 1.6596 0.8536 55.32% 55.32%   
  Mixed Participants 0.8061 0.2717 26.87% 82.19%   
  Quiet Participants 0.5343 . 17.81% 100.00%   
              
              
Source: authors' calculation on Mercer's data 
  
Table V – Lagged market volatility and participants’ type 
a) Interquantile regression of the number of new active members and market volatility (monthly): Sample Scheme in red 
    
TOTAL 
Sample 
Macro-
Scheme 
Scheme 
MMM 
    
  
Lagged Market Volatility 
 
88.78 -51.94 88.78* 
  
(1.65) (-0.48) (1.80) 
  
  
  
Constant 
 
21.47** 50.56*** 21.47** 
    (2.83) (3.70) (3.29) 
  
  
  
Observations 
 
128 128 128 
    
  
 Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 
Source: authors' calculation on Mercer's data 
 
b) Simple regression of the monthly number of new active members  and market volatility (by participants' type) -: 
Sample Scheme in red 
       
      
  TOTAL Sample Macro-Scheme Scheme MMM 
 
Gamblers 
Mixed 
Participants 
Quiet 
Participants 
Gamblers 
Mixed 
Participants 
Quiet 
Participants 
Gamblers 
Mixed 
Participants 
Quiet 
Participants 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
Lagged Market Volatility 13.17* 9.253** -6.271 6.381 38.41 -7.596 12.82* 6.135 -7.094 
 
(1.89) (2.06) (-0.49) (0.61) (1.53) (-0.59) (1.76) (1.37) (-0.55) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
Constant 2.382*** 8.744*** 9.154*** 6.440*** 18.97*** 10.25*** 2.773*** 9.550*** 9.415*** 
  (3.72) (21.14) (7.84) (6.66) (8.22) (8.70) (4.13) (23.21) (7.95) 
Observations 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 
Adjusted R-squared 0.020 0.025 -0.006 -0.005 0.010 -0.005 0.016 0.007 -0.006 
       
      
 Standard errors in parentheses, * p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001 
Source: authors' calculation on Mercer's data 
  
Table VI – Multinomial logit analysis of participants’ behaviour: marginal effects 
  Change in Prob. Standard error  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Predicted outcome: Dormant participant (78.93% probability at mean values, 71.63% sample) 
Age at enrolment -0.007732*** 0.001976 -0.011604 -0.003859 
Male -0.165276*** 0.035070 -0.234013 -0.096540 
Av. transaction value 0.000008*** 0.000001 0.000007 0.000009 
Exper. in the scheme -0.003576 0.003406 -0.010251 0.003100 
Exper. in the company 0.0008956 0.003904 -0.006756 0.008547 
Year √ √ √ √ 
Fund ID -0.0013369 0.000524 -0.002364 -0.000310 
Predicted outcome: Low frequency and Few transactions (0.02% probability at mean values, 2.82% sample) 
Age at enrolment 0.000001 0.000004 -0.000007 0.000008 
Male -0.000050 0.000092 -0.000230 0.000130 
Av. transaction value 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Exper. in the scheme -0.000074 0.000085 -0.000240 0.000091 
Exper. in the company 0.000045 0.000053 -0.000059 0.000149 
Year √ √ √ √ 
Fund ID -0.000007 0.000010 -0.000026 0.000012 
Predicted outcome: Low frequency and Many transactions (11.21% probability at mean values, 3.30% sample) 
Age at enrolment 0.002157 0.001594 -0.000968 0.005282 
Male -0.010735 0.014965 -0.040065 0.018596 
Av. transaction value 0.0000012*** 0.000000 0.000001 0.000002 
Exper. in the scheme -0.010530*** 0.001224 -0.012929 -0.008132 
Exper. in the company 0.012299*** 0.001456 0.009445 0.015153 
Year √ √ √ √ 
Fund ID 0.000884** 0.000378 0.000143 0.001625 
Predicted outcome: High frequency and Few transactions (0.006% probability at mean values, 10.75% sample) 
Age at enrolment 0.000007 0.000004 -0.000002 0.000015 
Male 0.000298*** 0.000071 0.000159 0.000438 
Av. transaction value 0.000000** 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
Exper. in the scheme 0.000003 0.000002 -0.000001 0.000007 
Exper. in the company -0.000001 0.000002 -0.000004 0.000003 
Year √ √ √ √ 
Fund ID 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000001 
Predicted outcome: High frequency and Many transactions (9.83% probability at mean values, 11.50% sample) 
Age at enrolment 0.001975* 0.001168 -0.000315 0.004265 
Male 0.175763*** 0.036014 0.105178 0.246348 
Av. transaction value -0.000006*** 0.000001 -0.000007 -0.000005 
Exper. in the scheme 0.012669*** 0.003284 0.006232 0.019106 
Exper. in the company -0.012903*** 0.003658 -0.020073 -0.005732 
Year √ √ √ √ 
Fund ID 0.000213 0.000375 -0.000522 0.000947 
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.001  
Appendix B: Gamblers’ operations and market 
trend 
This appendix provides a robustness check for the definition of gamblers, which is a central 
issue of the paper. We used information about the types of operations undertaken by the 
participants and the upside/downside trend of the financial market (FTSE100) to check for 
the consistency of the behaviour of those whom we labelled gamblers with that expected in 
the standard literature on gambling. 
Given the structure of the database, we focused our attention on two characteristics – 
the ‘gambler’s ruin’ and the lack of diversification. According to the ‘gambler’s ruin’, 
gamblers behave asymmetrically during winning and losing streaks, increasing (or at least 
failing to decrease) their commitment during the latter (see, among the others Song and 
Song 2013). Regarding the lack of diversification, and supplementing the cognitive literature 
on gambling, Garrett and Russell (1999) state that gamblers’ attitude to risk is not the main 
driver of their action. Based on these results, in our database we checked the trading 
operations undertaken by those we labelled as ‘gamblers’ to find signs of an increased 
activity during the downtrend of the market (Hypothesis A1, henceforth H-A1) and of a 
scarce attention to the risk profiles of their operations (Hypothesis A2, henceforth H-A2). 
To investigate H-A1, we defined a ‘downtrend’ as a period of two (Definition 1) or 
alternatively three (Definition 2) consecutive months with a negative return of the FTSE 100 
index and performed the analysis for both – the Macroscheme and the whole database. As 
shown in Table A.1, the number of downtrend months shrinks with the stricter Definition 2 
(26 rather than 34 when Definition 1 is adopted). Looking at the Macroscheme, the average 
number of monthly transactions undertaken by gamblers increased during periods of 
downtrend (+10.01 per cent and +4.44 per cent if we adopt the weaker Definition 1). Results 
are also confirmed in the whole database, where transaction increased by 3.92 and 2.56 per 
cent respectively adopting Definitions 2 or 1. The increased dynamism of gamblers during a 
period of negative returns confirms our expectations with respect to H-A1. 
Table A.1 Number of average per-month transactions  
 
 
Macroscheme Total database 
        
 
Months 
Total 
transactions 
Average 
per-month 
transactions 
Variation 
during 
downtrend 
Total 
transactions 
Average 
per-month 
transactions 
Variation 
during 
downtrend 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
DEFINITION 1 ( Two consecutive months of negative return) 
 
 
  
  
  
  
Uptrend 95 293621 3091 
 
879368 9257 
 
Downtrend 34 109750 3228 + 4.44% 322791 9494 + 2.56% 
  
  
  
  
  
 
DEFINITION 2 ( three consecutive months of negative return) 
  
  
  
  
  
Uptrend 103 315705 3065 
 
952347 9246 
 
Downtrend 26 87666 3372 + 10.01% 249812 9608 + 3.92% 
Data Source: Authors’ calculation and London Stock Exchange 
To investigate H-A2, we turned our attention to a subset of the database providing 
information about the types of operation undertaken by participants. An overall number of 
152,497 trades were categorized into four types – switching between funds, quoting, partial 
selling and exit. We focused on switching for two reasons: it is the largest category (51.59 
per cent vis-à-vis 25.38, 22.47 and 0.56 per cent respectively of exit, quote and partial 
selling) and it carries information about the participants’ attitude to risk. 
Unlike showing a preference to take and retake risky investment decisions time and time 
again, gamblers are supposed to disregard standard risk considerations among the drivers of 
their action and this is what we aimed to detect in our database. To this aim, we listed the 
funds available to the participants and classified them with respect to their asset allocation 
by adopting the following rule. We set up three categories of decreasing riskiness starting 
from the riskiest (‘equity‘), namely funds whose assets were more than 60 per cent in 
equity, a less risky ‘balanced’ category of funds investing between 40 and 60 per cent in 
equities and the safest ‘not-equity’ whose funds have less than 40 per cent of equity assets. 
Out of a total number of 293 funds, equity represented 55.78 per cent of the available 
choices, balanced 10.54 per cent and not-equity 33.67. We then turned our attention to the 
risk profile of each switching operation coming from gamblers and analysed the difference 
between the asset class of the old (left) fund and that of the new (entered) one. Due to the 
structure and characteristics of the database, we concentrated on the representative 
scheme MMM only and Table A.2 shows the results of the analysis. The steps of 
increase/decrease measure the difference in the risky category between the old and new 
fund in any operation. Consequently, a one-step increase could mean an operation of 
switching from a fund in the balanced category to one in equity. A two-step decrease, 
instead, could mean switching from a fund in equity to one in not-equity. As shown, the vast 
majority of the switching trades were between two funds in the same risk category (44.83 
per cent), thus signalling that, when acting, gamblers were scarcely concerned about 
rebalancing their portfolios with respect to risk categories of asset allocation. This confirms 
our hypothesis H-A2. 
Table A.2 Riskiness of the switching operations from gamblers 
 
Representative scheme MMM 
      
 
Two-step 
decreased 
riskiness 
One-step 
decreased 
riskiness 
Same risk 
category 
Two-step 
increased 
riskiness 
One-step 
increased 
riskiness 
      Share of switching 
operations 
18.69% 8.40% 44.83% 10.44% 17.64% 
Data Source: Authors’ calculation 
The final step was to match together the information about the type of operations 
undertake by gamblers and market trends. To show a consistent gambling behaviour, the 
agents we defined as such were supposed to increase their action in periods of downtrend, 
irrespectively of considerations about risk in asset allocation. We performed the analysis on 
the representative MMM scheme only with respect to switching operations between funds 
in the same risk category and Table A.3 shows the results. 
Table A.3 Frequency analysis of switching operations between funds in the same risk category from gamblers during 
periods of market up/down trend 
 
 
Representative MMM Scheme 
     
 
Months Total transactions 
Average per-month 
transactions 
Variation during 
downtrend 
 
 
  
  
 
DEFINITION 1 ( Two consecutive months of negative return) 
 
    
  
Uptrend 95 3578 38 
 
Downtrend 34 1486 44 16.04% 
 
    
  
 
DEFINITION 2 ( three consecutive months of negative return) 
  
  
  
Uptrend 103 3581 35 
 
Downtrend 26 1483 57 64.06% 
Data Source: Authors’ calculation 
Once again, our expectations were met in that we detected an even larger order of 
magnitude in the increase of the activity. The encouraging results confirmed the robustness 
of our classification defining gamblers. 
 
 
